The dependency of the banks' assets and liabilities: evidence from Germany by Memmel, Christoph & Schertler, Andrea
The dependency of the banks’ assets






Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies
No 14/2009
Discussion Papers represent the authors’ personal opinions and do not necessarily reflect the views of the
Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff. 
 
 
Editorial Board:   Heinz  Herrmann 
    Thilo  Liebig 

















Deutsche Bundesbank, Wilhelm-Epstein-Strasse 14, 60431 Frankfurt am Main,  
Postfach  10 06 02, 60006 Frankfurt am Main 
 
Tel +49  69 9566-0 
Telex within Germany  41227, telex from abroad  414431 
 
Please address all orders in writing to: Deutsche Bundesbank, 
Press and Public Relations Division, at the above address or via fax  +49 69 9566-3077
Internet http://www.bundesbank.de  
Reproduction permitted only if source is stated. 
ISBN  978-3–86558–574–5  (Printversion) 
ISBN  978-3–86558–575–2  (Internetversion) Abstract
Developments in risk-transfer instruments and risk management techniques in the
last two decades have fundamentally changed how banks manage their assets and lia-
bilities. In this document we show that, for all three sectors of German universal banks
(private commercial banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks), asset-liability de-
pendency declined over the period 1994-2007, the decline was strongest for those banks
that use more than sector-average amounts of derivatives. Only in the case of private
commercial banks, we do ﬁnd that lower regulatory capital has coincided with higher
asset-liability dependencies. Over our sample period, the diﬀerence has diminished
since poorly-capitalized private commercial banks have reduced their asset-liability
dependencies more intensively than their well-capitalized counterparts. Moreover, we
ﬁnd that proﬁtability matters for the asset-liability dependency but not in the same
way for all three sectors. Asset-liability dependency is lower for private commercial
banks with higher provision income, savings banks with lower ROE volatilities and
cooperative banks with higher ROEs.
JEL classiﬁcation: G 21, G32
Keywords: Asset-liability dependency, maturity, correlation analysisNon-technical summary
The classic business model of banks consists of granting long-term loans and collecting
deposits of short maturity. These term and liquidity transformations can be a substantial
part of banks’ earnings, but they are accompanied by risk. Especially in times of cri-
sis, banks with considerable term and liquidity mismatches will ﬁnd it diﬃcult to secure
suﬃcient funding. These banks may be obliged to sell their assets at large discounts.
The degree of term and liquidity transformation can be approximately inferred from
banks’ balance sheets. If a bank’s assets are closely matched with its liabilities, then this
bank will practice term and liquidity transformation only to a small degree.
In our paper, we analyse three research topics. Our ﬁrst topic is the development of
the term and liquidity transformation in recent years. We expect that the change in the
economic conditions (regulation, competition, ﬁnancial innovations) have inﬂuenced the
term and liquidity transformation. The second topic is the role of banking regulation. It
can be assumed that regulation has an impact especially on those banks that operate at
the regulatory limit. The third topic concerns banks’ earnings. As stated above, term
and liquidity transformation is proﬁtable, but may be risky. Therefore, we analyse the
earnings, the composition of the earnings and their volatility.
Our empirical results for the German banking market can be summarised in three core
statements: (i) There is an upward trend with respect to the term and liquidity trans-
formation for all three sectors (private commercial banks, savings banks and cooperative
banks). This trend is mainly driven by long-term loans to non-banks and by short-term
deposits of non-banks. (ii) Private commercial banks that are close to the regulatory limit
concerning capital and liquidity practise less term and liquidity transformation. We do not
ﬁnd this eﬀect for savings and cooperative banks. (iii) Contrary to expectations, banks
tend to be riskier (measured by the earnings volatility) the smaller the extent of their term
and liquidity transformation.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Das klassische Gesch¨ aft der Banken besteht darin, langfristige Kredite herauszureichen und
kurzfristige Mittel anzunehmen. Diese Fristen- und Liquidit¨ atstransformation kann einen
erheblichen Teil der Bankertr¨ age ausmachen. Allerdings gehen diese Ertr¨ age mit Risiken
einher. Besonders in Krisenzeiten wird es Banken schwerfallen, sich zu reﬁnanzieren,
wenn sie im großen Umfang Fristen- und Liquidit¨ atstransformation betreiben. Sie sind
dann gezwungen, Verm¨ ogensgegenst¨ ande mit großen Abschl¨ agen zu verkaufen.
Das Ausmaß der Fristen- und Liquidit¨ atstransformation l¨ asst sich approximativ aus
der Bilanz einer Bank erschließen. Sind etwa die Aktivpositionen eng an die Passivpo-
sitionen gebunden, dann wird diese Bank wohl nur zu einem geringen Teil Fristen- und
Liquidit¨ atstransformation betreiben.
In unserem Papier untersuchen wir drei Themenbereiche. Der erste Bereich widmet
sich dem zeitlichen Trend der Fristen- und Liquidit¨ atstransformation. Wir erwarten, dass
sich die ¨ Anderungen der wirtschaftlichen Rahmenbedingungen (Regulierung, Wettbewerb,
Finanzinnovation) in der Fristen- und Liquidit¨ atstransformation niedergeschlagen hat.
Der zweite Bereich befasst sich mit der Regulierung. Es ist anzunehmen, dass sich die
Regulierung besonders bei denjenigen Banken als wirksam erweist, die nahe am regula-
torischen Limit operieren. Der dritte Bereich befasst sich mit den Gewinnen. Wie oben
erw¨ ahnt, ist es ertragreich, aber auch riskant, Fristen- und Liquidit¨ atstransformation zu
betreiben. Deshalb untersuchen wir die Gewinne, die Zusammensetzung der Gewinne und
deren Volatilit¨ at.
Unsere empirischen Ergebnisse f¨ ur den deutschen Bankenmarkt k¨ onnen in drei Kern-
aussagen zusammengefasst werden: Erstens gibt es f¨ ur alle drei Bankensektoren (private
Gesch¨ aftsbanken, Sparkassen und Kreditgenossenschaften) einen zunehmenden Trend in
Bezug auf das Ausmaß der Fristen- und Liquidit¨ atstransformation. Dieser Trend wird vor
allem von den langfristigen Kundenkrediten und den kurzfristigen Einlagen von Nicht-
banken getrieben. Zweitens betreiben private Gesch¨ aftsbanken, die nahe an der reg-
ulatorischen Grenze f¨ ur das Eigenkapital bzw. f¨ ur die Liquidit¨ at sind, eine geringere
Fristen- und Liquidit¨ atstransformation. Bei den Sparkassen und Genossenschaften ﬁnden
wir diesen Eﬀekt nicht. Drittens sind – entgegen den Erwartungen – die Banken risiko-
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6 Conclusion 21The Dependency of the Banks’ Assets and Liabilities:
Evidence from Germany1
1 Introduction
These on-going term and liquidity transformations conducted in the banking industry are
an essential practice as banks earn a substantial part of their proﬁts from carrying out
these transformations. However, the proﬁts from these transformations are accompanied
by risks. Especially in times of crisis, banks with a considerable degree of term and liquidity
transformation may ﬁnd it diﬃcult to secure new funding and may be forced to sell illiquid
or even liquid assets at large discounts. As various examples in the current crisis have
demonstrated, large term and liquidity transformation may call the whole existence of the
bank into question.
Several decades ago, banks limited their exposure to term and liquidity risks mainly
by constraining their asset and liability structure. Two decades of developments in new ﬁ-
nancial instruments and risk management techniques appear to have given banks leeway in
structuring their assets and liabilities without increasing their exposure to term and liquid-
ity risks. For instance, the increasing notional amounts of interest rate swaps and other
derivatives would seem to indicate that nowadays banks mitigate maturity mismatches
between assets and liabilities more frequently than in the past. Apart from derivative
instruments, banks may limit their exposure to term and liquidity risks by using loans
sales and securitization or loans with adjustable interest rates.
Our paper determines how asset-liability dependency has developed in recent years.
To our mind, the banks’ asset-liability dependency is closely (negatively) related to the
extent to which banks practise term and liquidity transformation: Banks that are involved
in only a little transformation are inclined to fund their assets with liabilities of the same
maturity and nature. We develop two measures that condense the information from pair-
wise correlation coeﬃcients between single asset and liability positions. Our ﬁrst measure
1The opinions expressed in this paper are those of the authors and do not necessarily reﬂect the opinions
of the Deutsche Bundesbank. We thank John V. Duca and the participants of the SGF 2009 meeting, of the
Banking Workshop 2009 (M¨ unster) and of the Bundesbank research seminar for their helpful comments.
We thank Henriette Reinhold for her help with the data preparation and evaluation.
1is a weighted sum of all squared pairwise correlations that provides information on the
overall asset-liability dependency. Our second measure is the coeﬃcient of determination
of a certain regression. This measure complements our ﬁrst measure, since it gives in-
sights into the dependency degree of single asset and liability positions. Using data on
the three sectors of universal banks in the German banking industry (private commercial
banks, savings banks, and cooperative banks), we ﬁnd that dependency between the assets
and liabilities decreased over the period 1994 to 2007; the eﬀect is most pronounced for
savings banks and least pronounced for private commercial banks. This decline in asset-
liability dependency can be attributed to a lower liability dependency of long-term loans
to non-banks and to a lower asset dependency of short-term deposits.
Our analysis also provides evidence relating to whether the regulatorily deﬁned bank
capital and the bank proﬁtability shape the asset-liability dependency. As capital absorbs
risks and expands a bank’s risk-bearing capacity (Bhattacharaya and Thakor (1993), Re-
pullo (2004)), well-capitalized banks may transform maturities more intensively leading
to a lower asset-liability dependency. A higher proﬁtability may be accompanied by a
lower asset-liability dependency since banks may lose proﬁt opportunities when keeping
a strong asset-liability dependency. While these arguments may have been relevant two
decades ago, it is questionable whether they are still relevant today. Only in the case of
private commercial banks we do ﬁnd that banks with lower regulatory capital have higher
asset-liability dependencies than banks with higher regulatory capital. However, the dif-
ference between well-capitalized and poorly-capitalized banks diminishes over time; this
is because the asset-liability dependency of poorly-capitalized private commercial banks
declines more strongly than that of their well-capitalized counterparts. Bank proﬁtability
matters for the asset-liability dependency, but not in the same way for all three sectors.
We ﬁnd that the asset-liability dependency is lower for private commercial banks with
higher provision income, savings banks with lower ROE volatilities and cooperative banks
with higher ROEs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 illuminates the back-
ground for our empirical analysis of the (on-balance sheet) asset-liability dependency. Sec-
tion 3 introduces the dependency measures and test procedures, and Section 4 describes
the data. Section 5 presents our ﬁndings, and Section 6 contains the conclusion.
22 Background
The traditional intermediary function of banks is to collect money of short maturity from a
large number of depositors and invest it in illiquid, long-term loans. These transformation
activities expose banks to interest rate, liquidity and credit risks. While credit risk is
only related to the asset-side of the banks’ balance sheets, the interest rate and liquidity
risk is associated with the liability side, which reﬂects the funding decision of banks,
and with the asset side, which reﬂects the investment decision of banks. In the past,
when risk-transfer instruments were not available, banks could limit their exposure to
interest rate and liquidity risks by applying the golden balance-sheet rule. According to
this rule, long-term assets were to be ﬁnanced by long-term liabilities and equity, while
short-term liabilities were to be used to ﬁnance short-term assets only. In later years,
duration methods allowed banks to match their assets and liabilities more precisely. When
yield-sensitive assets and liabilities have the same repricing periods (Staikouras (2006)), a
duration matching of assets and liabilities immunizes the banks’ net wealth against interest
rate movements because present-value gains or losses of the assets through interest rate
changes are oﬀset by present-value gains or losses of the liabilities.
Decades of ﬁnancial innovations have changed how banks manage their assets and
liabilities as, nowadays, risk-mitigation techniques enable banks to transfer interest risks
along with other kinds of risks to third parties. At an early stage, interest rate swaps were
introduced, allowing banks to exchange interest payments, such as a stream of ﬁxed interest
payments against a stream of interest payments that varies with the market interest rate.
When employing appropriately designed interest rate swaps, banks can fund long-term
loans with short-term liabilities without being exposed to the risks stemming from interest
rate movements. While banks may employ interest rate swaps for hedging reasons, they
can also employ them for speculative reasons. Empirical evidence focused on US banks
indicates, however, that hedging considerations seem to drive banks’ use of these swaps:
banks that use derivatives have higher growth rates in business lending and they hold
lower levels of capital than banks that do not use derivatives (e.g. Brewer et al. (2000),
Brewer et al. (2001)).
Interest rate swaps are also commonly used in Germany, but the intensity of their use
diﬀers across the three sectors of the German (universal) banking system, which is not
3surprising when one considers the substantial diﬀerences between these three pillars.2 The
notional amounts of total interest rate swaps of private commercial banks were 53 % of
total assets in 1993, the respective number in 2007 was 1,283 % of total assets. The bulk
of interest rate swaps in the sector of private commercial banks is conducted with the big
banks: in the case of big banks, interest rate swaps accounted for 96 % (2,016 %) of total
assets in 1993 (2007) (Deutsche Bundesbank (2000), Deutsche Bundesbank (2008)). For
savings and cooperative banks, the volume of interest rate swaps to assets was relatively
low in 1993 (1.1 % for savings banks and 0.3 % for cooperative banks, respectively). It
increased substantially during our sample period: for savings banks, interest rate swaps
were 22.5 % in 2007, the compound annual growth rate of interest rate swaps was (at
29.3 % p.a.) between 1993 and 2000 much more pronounced than between 2000 and 2007,
when it was just 18.8 % p.a.(Deutsche Bundesbank (2000), Deutsche Bundesbank (2008)).
More recently, several new risk mitigation tools, such as loan sales, asset securitization
and adjustable loans, have been introduced that allow banks to increase their liquidity and
to reduce their exposure to interest rate risks (Ambrose et al. (2005)). A loan sale allows
the bank to reduce the duration of its assets, while a loan with adjustable rates allows the
bank to have a mismatch in the maturities of assets and liabilities without being exposed
to interest rate movements (Strahan (2008)). In particular, cash transactions leading
to cash inﬂows allow banks to restructure their balance sheet (Gorton and Pennacchi
(1995)). These new ﬁnancial instruments have also gained in popularity with German
banks in recent years: Bannier and H¨ ansel (2007) use a sample of European banks for
the period 1997 to 2004, which includes about 60 German banks of larger size. Between
1997 and 1999, their securitization activity was negligible, while between 2000 and 2004
approximately 12 German banks were involved in asset securitization per year. Not only
are German private commercial banks active in asset securitization of performing loans,
but also cooperative banks: using VR Circle, a securitization platform created in 2005,
cooperative banks securitized loans with a volume of 1.1 billion euro (Financial Times
2For instance, whereas the private commercial banks and the cooperative banks are privately owned,
most savings banks belong to the state or the local communities. In contrast, savings and cooperative banks
share similar aims in business activities: for banks of both sectors, proﬁt maximization is not their primary
goal; the general welfare and the welfare of their members, respectively, are also of great importance.
For more information about the German banking system see ”Sachverst¨ andigenrat zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlichen Lage (2008)”.
4Deutschland, November 11, 2008). With regard to adjustable loans, the amount of bonds
with variable rates to total bond holdings increased substantially during our sample period.
In 1996, almost 11 % of the German banks’ bonds holdings had variable interest rates,
while in 2007 more than 45 % of the bond holdings had variable interest rates (Deutsche
Bundesbank (2000), Deutsche Bundesbank (2005), Deutsche Bundesbank (2008)).
Use of a mix of these old and new risk-mitigation instruments might have allowed banks
to reduce their asset-liability dependencies in recent years. However, during the last two
decades, other features of the ﬁnancial landscape in which banks operate have changed
fundamentally, and these changes may also have motivated or even pressured banks to
reduce their asset-liability dependency. One huge change that has shaped the ﬁnancial
landscape was the adoption of the information and communication technologies within
the banking business. The supply of online banking services may have reduced, at least
temporarily, banks’ ability to set prices, especially of those banks who have relied on more
traditional business models and adopted new services at a later date, such as savings and
cooperative banks. However, the long-term implications of these technological innovations
on competition is unclear (Guzman (2001)) and recent evidence based on the H-statistic
(Rosse and Panzar (1987)), which summarizes input price elasticities, does not indicate
a change in the degree of competition among German banks (see Hempell (2002) for the
period 1993-1998 and Schaeck and Cihak (2007) for the period 1999-2004).
While these technological innovations may not have changed the degree of competition,
they have certainly had an impact on how banks do their business. Computer technologies
allowed banks to develop computationally intensive techniques to measure and manage
the various kinds of risks they face. Moreover, it has made it possible for banks to oﬀer
customers a wide range of online services, such as paying bills or making investments online
(Pikkarainen et al. (2004)), yielding a lowering in transportation costs (Vives (2001)). As
a result of lower costs, traditional banks might face increased competition from non-
traditional banks and non-bank ﬁrms, thus inﬂuencing the prices of banking products on
both side of the balance sheet. This, in turn, may have changed the composition of banks’
funding sources: in the US, traditional deposit funding has declined in recent years and
banks have had to supplement traditional sources with potentially less stable and more
expensive funding sources (Harvey and Spong (2001)).
Finally, the regulatory landscape in which banks operate changed almost continu-
5ously during the sample period. Examples of this are the minimum requirements for
the conduct of trading business (Mindestanforderungen an das Betreiben von Handels-
gesch¨ aften, MaH) in 1995, the minimum requirements for the organisation of internal
revision (Mindestanforderungen an die Ausgestaltung der internen Revision, MaIR) in
2000, the minimum requirements for the credit business (Mindestanforderungen an das
Kreditgesch¨ aft, MaK) in 2002, and ﬁnally, the minimum requirements for risk manage-
ment (Mindestanforderungen an das Risikomanagement, MaRisk) in 2005 that replaced
the MaH, MaIR and MaK. The MaRisk gives concrete form to the supervisory review
process speciﬁed in Pillar II of the Basel Accord.
Apart from these requirements, which formulate how banks have to behave when con-
ducting their business, the prudential regulations specifying minimum requirements for
banks’ capital and liquidity changed, as well. During our sample period, the prudential
capital regulation was made concrete in Principle I (Grundsatz I) and underwent only just
a few minor changes. The banks’ regulatory capital ratio according to Principle I was
the quotient of their regulatory capital and their risk weighted assets (capital adequacy
ratio according to Basel I). The regulator required this ratio to be at least equal to 8%.
In 2007, Principle I was replaced by the Solvency Regulation (Solvabilit¨ atsverordnung)
which transposes the Pillar I and III of the Basel Accord into German law.
With respect to the liquidity regulation, a new regulatory framework (Principle II)
was introduced in 2000 requiring banks to calculate and report a liquidity ratio. The
regulator requires this ratio, which results from dividing assets available within the next
month by payment obligations callable within the next month, to be at least equal to
1. The liquidity regulation is built on the proposition that solvent and proﬁtable banks
face no obstacles in ensuring medium- and long-term refunding (Deutsche Bundesbank
(1999)). However, they may be faced with the risk of liquidity shortages in the short
run (Federal Banking Supervisory Oﬃce (FBSO) (1998)). It focuses, therefore, on the
withdrawal risk of liabilities and the refunding risks in the short run (Sch¨ oning (2004),
Sp¨ ork and Auge-Dickhut (1999)). Before 2000, the liquidity regulation (Principle II and
III (old)) focused on the middle and long-term liquidity needs of banks and put emphasis
on refunding risks resulting from banks’ term transformation (Hartmann-Wendels and
Wendels (1999), Sp¨ ork and Auge-Dickhut (1999)). In doing so, it built on the golden
banking rule, specifying that long-term (medium-term) assets were ﬁnanced by long-term
(medium-term) liabilities, as well as on the deposit base theory, assuming that callable
6deposits were not withdrawn at once, but were available to the banks for a longer period,
and on the shiftability theory, specifying that particular asset types did not need to be
funded by liabilities with the same maturity (Sch¨ oning (2004)).
The purpose of our paper is not to disentangle the factors that have motivated, pres-
sured or allowed banks to change their asset-liability dependency. Rather, our paper gives
preliminary insights into how the dependency of banks’ assets and liability has changed
over time. By comparing the asset-liability dependency in the three sectors of German
universal banks, our analysis gives an initial insight into the question of whether the
whole German universal banking system underwent similar changes with respect to the
asset-liability dependency, which would indicate a convergence among banks belonging to
diﬀerent sectors, or whether banks belonging to diﬀerent sectors diﬀer fundamentally with
respect to their asset-liability dependency, which would indicate that business models in
the sectors diﬀers just as much today as in the past.
We have chosen three questions to guide us in our empirical analysis, the ﬁrst of these
being: Has (on-balance sheet) asset-liability dependency declined in recent years in a
similar way for all three German universal banking sectors? Since the funding structure
between the three banking sectors diﬀers fundamentally, we also test whether single asset
and/or liability accounts drive the overall change in the asset-liability dependency. Since
banks within each sector might be relatively heterogenous, we also check whether the
decline in asset-liability dependency over time is more pronounced for banks using risk-
mitigation techniques more intensively.
The second question we pose is: Do banks whose capital or liquidity ratio is closer to
the regulatory threshold have signiﬁcantly higher asset-liability dependencies than banks
whose ratios are farther away from the threshold? The recent literature puts forward a
theory on how capital and term and liquidity transformation are related. According to
the risk-absorption hypothesis, capital absorbs risks and expands a bank’s risk-bearing
capacity (Bhattacharaya and Thakor (1993), Repullo (2004)). This hypothesis suggests
that well-capitalized banks transform maturities more intensively, reﬂected in a lower
asset-liability dependency. Thus, asset-liability dependency is expected to be negatively
correlated with bank capital because capital absorbs risks. A similar reasoning applies
to banks whose liquidity is closer to the regulatory threshold: these banks may be more
exposed to liquidity risk than banks which are a long way from the regulatory threshold.
7The former may limit their overall risk exposure by creating less term transformation
risk. This would imply that banks whose liquidity is closer to the threshold have a higher
asset-liability dependency than those banks whose liquidity is far away from the regula-
tory threshold. While these arguments might have been relevant two decades ago, it is
questionable whether they are still relevant today.
Our third question is: Has the relationship between proﬁtability and asset-liability
dependency changed fundamentally over time? Several decades ago, banks may have lost
proﬁt opportunities by keeping a strong asset-liability dependency. Alternatively, banks
with few proﬁtable investment opportunities were not obliged to use their ﬁnancial means
intensively for term transformation. Irrespective of this argument and, therefore, of the
causality between proﬁtability and asset-liability dependency, a higher proﬁtability can
be expected to have been accompanied by a lower asset-liability dependency. Such a high
dependency provides an old-style natural hedge against liquidity risk and market risk,
possibly suggesting that the return volatility and the asset-liability dependency are neg-
atively correlated. In addition, the changes in the ﬁnancial landscape have oﬀered banks
new sources of income especially in the form of fees levied for money market transactions
(Lapavitsas and Santos (2008)). DeYoung and Rice (2004) argue that non-interest income
does not replace, but rather coexists with interest income. This additionally generated
income may have given banks more leeway in determining their asset-liability structure.
3 Dependency measures
The literature has put forward several dependency measures, such as Pearson’s correlation
coeﬃcient, regression analysis and canonical correlations as applied in a recent study by
DeYoung and Yom (2008) and formerly by Simonson et al. (1983). The starting point of
all these measures is (more or less) the (matrix of) pairwise correlation coeﬃcients.
Canonical correlations are not so widespread in use and are sometimes diﬃcult to in-
terpret. This is why we do not use canonical correlations but condense the information
from the pairwise correlation coeﬃcients in diﬀerent measures. We use two measures;
each measure is calculated for each point in time and for each banking group. Our ﬁrst
measure, φ, is a weighted sum of all squared pairwise correlations that provides informa-
tion on the overall asset-liability dependency. Our second measure, τ, is the coeﬃcient
8of determination of a regression analysis that provides an insight into how single asset
(liability) positions depend on the liability (asset) structure.
Let wA and wL describe the structure of a bank’s assets and liabilities, respectively.
wA
i is the share of the (asset) position i with respect to total assets, and wL
j is the share of
(liability) position j with respect to total liabilities plus equity. The Pearson correlation
coeﬃcient between wA
i and wL
















The measure φ has a number of desirable features: (i) In terms of construction, is it
conﬁned to the interval between 0 and 1. (ii) It summarizes the single pairwise correlation
coeﬃcients ρij into one ﬁgure. The pairwise correlations are weighted according to their
average weight in the balance sheet. The denominator equals one, if all the assets and
all the liabilities are included in the positions under consideration. (iii) Although the
level of the measure is hard to interpret, it can serve as the basis for comparisons in the
time dimension and in the cross section. A higher level of this measure suggests a higher
dependency of assets and liabilities.
















where ˆ ρij is the empirical correlation coeﬃcient of the balance sheet shares wA
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which is calculated from the cross section of the K banks. ¯ wA
i and ¯ wL
j are the averages of









To test whether the asset-liability dependency has declined over time, we carry out a
non-parametric test of the null hypothesis according to which the dependency measure ˆ φ
rises at least as often as it drops compared to the previous year. Under the null hypoth-
esis, the number of negative year-to-year changes, i.e. X = #





X ∼ B(n − 1,p = 0.5) (4)
3In the empirical analysis, we use the median instead of the mean because the median has proven to
be less susceptible to outliers.
9where n is the number of years for which the dependency measure ˆ φ is available. In our
study, we have data for the period 1994 to 2007, which yield n − 1 = 13 year-to-year
changes. A similar procedure can be applied to test whether the cross sectional order
of the measure in diﬀerent subsamples remains the same over the years. Suppose there
are three subsamples, then the number of years Y for which the order of the dependency
measure is in a given order, say Y = #(φt,1 < φt,2 < φt,3), is binomially distributed (under
the hypothesis that the dependency measure is equal across the subsamples):
Y ∼ B(n,p = 1/6) 4 (5)
Our second measure gives insights into the degree of dependency between a single asset
position i and the structure of the liabilities and vice versa. To determine the degree of
dependency for each single asset position we run the following regression:
wA
i,k = αi + β1,iwL
1,k + ... + βJ,iwL
J,k + εA
i,k i = 1,...,I (6)
We use the coeﬃcients of determination R2
i of these regressions as the dependency mea-
sures τA
i . This dependency measure can be seen as the maximum squared correlation
between the weight of asset i and any linear combination of the liability weights. Note
the similarity to canonical correlations which are the maximum correlation of assets and









For each liability position, the measure τL
j is estimated correspondingly using asset shares
as RHS variables.
This measure has several advantages: (i) As our ﬁrst measure, it is conﬁned to the
interval between 0 and 1. (ii) It summarizes the single pairwise correlations ρij into
one ﬁgure for each asset and liability position, respectively. (iii) As the coeﬃcient of
determination is widely used, this measure is relatively easy to communicate and interpret.
Testing whether this measure of the asset-liability dependency has declined over time
is not straightforward as the distribution of the empirical equivalent ˆ τi
A is not easy to
determine, even when the residuals are normally distributed. However, in the appendix,
we describe a test which allows us to test the hypothesis of equal measures τA
i at diﬀerent
points of time t and t0, i.e. H0 : τA
i,t = τA
i,t0.
4The probabilty is 1/6, because there are six permutations of three elements.
104 Data
We use year-end data from the Bundesbank’s monthly balance sheet statistics for the
years 1994 to 2007. These statistics include the balance sheet information of all banks in
Germany, broken down into diﬀerent asset and liability positions according to the type of
the ﬁnancial asset or liability (e.g. equity or debt), the type of the counterparty (e.g. bank
or non-bank) and the maturity of the ﬁnancial asset or liability (e.g. initial maturities
up to one year (short-term) and of more than one year (long-term)). Our analysis starts
in 1994 because otherwise the asset and liability structure would not be deﬁned in a
consistent manner over time.
We subdivide the banks’ assets and liabilities into eight and seven accounts, respec-
tively. The asset positions are cash, short-term interbank loans, long-term interbank loans,
short-term loans to non-banks, long-term loans to non-banks, bonds, other securities and
other assets. Accordingly, the banks liabilities are broken down into saving accounts,
short-term interbank liabilities, long-term interbank liabilities, short-term liabilities from
non-banks, long-term liabilities from non-banks, own funds and other liabilities. To avoid
perfect multicollinearity among the asset and liability positions, we skip the positions other
assets and other liabilities.
Insert Table 1 about here
Table 1 depicts the structure of the banks’ assets and liabilities summarized across all three
banking sectors in our sample, from which we removed all bank-year observations, when
the asset or liability position was negative or greater than total assets. For each asset and
liability position, we present the value of the 25th, 50th and 75th percentile. Long-term
loans to non-banks and bonds are the most relevant asset positions, while savings accounts
and short-term deposits are the most relevant liability positions of German banks.
Insert Table 2 about here
Table 2 presents the mean shares of the asset and liability positions broken down into the
three banking sectors.5 A test of equal means across the three banking sectors suggests
some pronounced diﬀerences among these three banking sectors: On average, (i) private
5Private commercial banks include subsidiaries of foreign banks.
11commercial banks have much higher volumes of short-term interbank assets and liabilities
than savings and cooperative banks. (ii) Private commercial banks have lower volumes
of long-term loans to non-banks than savings and cooperative banks. (iii) In the case of
private commercial banks, savings accounts are not a prominent source of funding, whereas
they are for savings and cooperative banks.
5 Findings
5.1 Trend in the asset-liability dependencies
To gain insights into the trend in the asset-liability dependency, we calculated the measure
ˆ φ for each year and for each banking sector separately. The results presented in Figure 1
show that the dependency measure ˆ φ for assets and liabilities decreases in the last 14 years
for all three banking sectors. Since there are single years in which the dependency measure
ˆ φ rises compared to the previous year, we tested whether the dependency measure rises
at least as often as it drops (compared to the previous year). For each banking sector we
count 11 negative year-to-year changes in the dependency measure (out of the 13 year-
to-year changes of ˆ φ). Therefore, we can reject the null hypothesis for each sector at
the 5%-level.6 In addition, linear regressions of ˆ φt on a linear time trend always yield
signiﬁcantly negative coeﬃcients for all three banking sectors. This last test should be
interpreted with caution given the low number of observations (n = 14).
Insert Figure 1 about here
Figure 1 also reveals that the order in the asset-liability dependency of the three sectors
remains the same over the fourteen years of our study. The dependency between assets
and liabilities is by far stronger among the savings banks than among the banks of the two
other pillars. The lower asset-liability dependency of private commercial banks is not so
surprising since savings banks seem to be less reluctant to use new ﬁnancial instruments
than private commercial banks. More surprising is the order of the asset-liability depen-
dency between savings and cooperative banks: savings banks, which are on average larger
than cooperative banks, have a much higher dependency than cooperative banks.
6If X ∼ B(13,0.5), then Pr(X ≥ 11) = 1.1%.
12We use our second measure ˆ τA
i and ˆ τL
j , which was calculated for each year and each
banking sector separately, to determine the trend in single asset and liability positions.
Using this second measure in addition to our ﬁrst measure is useful in two respects. First,
it allows insights on whether a particular asset and/or liability position is responsible for
the decline in the asset-liability dependency. Second, it may provide insights into why
the asset-liability dependency decreased more strongly for savings banks than for private
commercial and cooperative banks.
Figure 2 depicts exemplarily the measure ˆ τ for the three most important balance-sheet
positions: the long-term loans to non-banks, the short-term deposits and the savings ac-
counts. The liability dependency of long-term loans to non-banks declines for savings and
cooperative banks but not for private commercial banks. The decline seems to be more
pronounced for savings banks than for cooperative banks. The asset dependency for short-
term deposits declines for all three banking sectors. The decline is most pronounced for
savings banks, and least pronounced for private commercial banks. Finally, the asset de-
pendency of savings accounts declines somewhat for cooperative banks, it stays unchanged
for private commercial banks and it increases for savings banks. With respect to the level
of ˆ τ, we observe the highest values for the balance positions long-term loans to non-banks.
This is not surprising as loans to non-banks constitute the banks’ core business (at least
for traditional universal banks).
Insert Figure 2 about here
To check whether the dependency ˆ τ of single balance-sheet positions has changed signiﬁ-
cantly over time, we concentrate on the three positions mentioned above and compare the
dependency measure in 1994 with that for 2000 and the dependency measure in 2000 with
that for 2007 for each banking sector. In Table 3, we show the changes in the dependency
measure ˆ τ. For instance, for the private commercial banks, the dependency ˆ τA
i of the
long-term loans to non-banks on the liability structure is 0.550 in 1994, 0.611 in 2000 and
0.456 in 2007 (see Figure 2). As displayed in the second row of Table 3, the changes are
0.061 from 1994 to 2000 and -0.155 from 2000 to 2007, respectively. We check whether
this diﬀerence in the dependency measure is signiﬁcant according to the test described in
the appendix. For example, for the private commercial banks, the change from 2000 to
2007 for the liability dependency of the long-term loans to non-banks is signiﬁcant at the
1% level.
13Insert Table 3 about here
Table 3 shows some similarities between the three banking sectors. First, for all three
banking sectors alike, neither the asset nor the liability side of the balance sheet alone can
be held responsible for the declining asset-liability dependencies. Second, all three banking
sectors have experienced declining dependencies of long-term loans to non-banks and short-
term deposits, while the dependency of the savings accounts did not change signiﬁcantly
during the period of our study. Thus, the decline in the asset-liability dependency depicted
in Figure 1 seems to be driven by the decline in the dependency of long-term loans to
non-banks and short-term deposits. Third, for all three banking sectors, the change in
the asset dependency of short-term deposits is more pronounced in the ﬁrst half (1994-
2000) than in the second half of our sample (2000-2007), which might reﬂect a change in
households’ behavior: at the end of the 1990s share holdings became more popular for
German households.
Table 3 also shows pronounced diﬀerences between private commercial and cooperative
banks, on the one hand, and savings banks, on the other hand. Thus, it gives insights
into why savings banks underwent more severe changes in the asset-liability dependency
than the other two banking sectors. In contrast to private commercial and cooperative
banks, savings banks also experienced a decline in the asset dependency of short-term
deposits in the sample period 2000 to 2007. Moreover, they experienced a stronger decline
in the liability dependency of long-term loans to non-banks than private commercial and
cooperative banks in both sample periods. This would suggest more severe changes in
the behavior of savings banks’ borrowers and depositors than in the other two banking
sectors.
If changes in the availability of new ﬁnancial instruments are responsible for declining
asset-liability dependency, then the decline should be more pronounced for banks which use
these instruments intensively. Since we do not have data on all new ﬁnancial instruments
that the banks can potentially use, we rely on two broad measures: the notional amount
of derivatives relative to total assets, and the bank’s size, i.e. its total assets. Bank size,
a bank characteristic that has received much attention in the literature (e.g., Berger and
Bouwman (2008), Kishan and Opiela (2000)), may be positively correlated not only with
the use of new ﬁnancial instruments but also with the use of advanced risk management
techniques that allow the banks to estimate and manage their diﬀerent risk exposures
14more precisely. Because of their advanced risk management techniques, larger banks may
be characterized by a lower asset-liability dependency than smaller banks.
We divided the sample of each sector into terciles according to the characteristic under
focus. Being in a higher tercile means to have a higher value in the characteristic under
focus. Table 4 gives the medians of the three terciles for each bank characteristic and
each sector. These numbers show the existing heterogeneity among the three sectors as
well as among the banks within a sector. The median cooperative bank is much smaller
than the median savings or private commercial bank. The median savings and coop-
erative bank employs fewer derivatives than the median private commercial bank. The
variation in the notional amounts of derivatives and the assets under management is much
more pronounced for private commercial than for savings and cooperative banks. Further
information on data deﬁnitions and sources is given in the appendix.
Insert Table 4 about here
In Table 5, we report the start values of the dependency measure and the changes in the
measure between 1994-2000 and 2000-2007 for derivatives and bank size. With regard to
private commercial banks’ derivatives, for instance, the dependency measure ˆ φ is 0.078
for the ﬁrst tercile (banks with the lowest derivative volume) and 0.103 and 0.151 for the
second and third tercile, respectively. For banks in the third tercile, the asset-liability
dependency declined more than that for banks in the ﬁrst and second tercile in the period
1994-2000. For instance, between 1994-2000, the asset-liability dependency declined by
-0.12 for the third tercile of private commercial banks, whereas it declined only by about
-0.04 and -0.02 for the ﬁrst and second tercile. These changes imply that private com-
mercial banks with high notional amounts of derivatives have reduced their asset-liability
dependency more intensively than other private commercial banks. The results match
with the evidence presented by DeYoung and Yom (2008) for US commercial banks, who
also ﬁnd that the asset-liability linkages are weaker for US banks using swaps intensively.
For German savings and cooperative banks, the derivative volume also inﬂuences the de-
gree of asset-liability dependency. Savings and cooperative banks with high asset-liability
dependencies in 1994 use derivatives more intensively. Between 1994 and 2000, the change
in asset-liability dependency is more pronounced for the third tercile than for the ﬁrst
and second terciles of savings and cooperative banks, while in the period 2000-2007, the
change in asset-liability dependency is no longer more pronounced for the third tercile.
15Insert Table 5 about here
Large private commercial banks initially exhibited a higher asset-liability dependency than
their smaller counterparts. In addition, the change in the dependency measure between
1994-2000 was (at -0.08) somewhat more pronounced for large private commercial banks
than for smaller ones, while the changes between 2000-2007 were quite similar for large
and smaller banks. Thus, larger private commercial banks, which tend to have a higher
aﬃnity for using new ﬁnancial instruments, reduced their asset-liability dependency much
more than their smaller counterparts. Although these results are similar but they do also
diﬀer from the evidence for US commercial banks (DeYoung and Yom (2008)): The asset-
liability dependency is stronger at large German and US commercial banks than at smaller
ones and size-based diﬀerences have diminished over time both in Germany and the US.
However, while small US commercial banks have increased their asset-liability dependency,
both large and small German private commercial banks experienced declining dependency.
At the beginning of our sample period, large savings banks had, unlike private commercial
banks, a lower asset-liability dependency than smaller savings banks, having declined
more strongly for large than for small savings banks between 1994 and 2000, while the
opposite was true between 2000 and 2007. For cooperative banks, size does not matter
in a systematic way for the asset-liability dependency: large and small cooperative banks
had similar asset-liability dependencies in 1994 and they experienced similar declines in
their dependencies over time.
5.2 Prudential regulations
In the text below, we describe whether the asset-liability dependency is related to pru-
dential capital and liquidity regulations. We group the banks in each banking sector into
terciles according to their capital or liquidity adequacy. Table 4, which gives descriptive
statistics for capital and liquidity ratios, indicates that even banks in the ﬁrst tercile (which
are closest to the regulatory threshold) have considerably high capital and liquidity ratios
as compared to the regulatory threshold of 8% and 1, respectively. We calculated the
dependency measure ˆ φ for each tercile group of each banking sector and for each year. In
Table 6, we condense the results as follows. For each tercile group of each banking sector
we report (i) the average dependency measure between 1994 and 2007, (ii) the change in
the dependency measure between 1994 and 2007 and (iii) the number of years in which the
16dependency measure has a cross-sectional increasing or decreasing order. The dependency
measure ˆ φ is characterized by an increasing order when ˆ φ1st ≤ ˆ φ2nd ≤ ˆ φ3rd, which implies
a negative correlation between the bank characteristic under focus and the asset-liability
dependency. It has a decreasing order when ˆ φ1st ≥ ˆ φ2nd ≥ ˆ φ3rd, which implies a positive
correlation between the bank characteristic under focus and the asset-liability dependency.
Since the order of the tercile groups probably changes over time, we carry out this analysis
for two subsamples, the ﬁrst from 1994-2000 and the second from 2001-2007.
As far as to the prudential capital regulation is concerned, private commercial banks
have a time-series means of the dependency measure of 0.154 for the ﬁrst tercile (banks
whose capital ratio is closest to the regulatory threshold) and 0.086 and 0.031 for the second
and third tercile, respectively. These time-series means suggest that the capital ratio and
the asset-liability dependency are negatively correlated. The cross-sectional order gives
deeper insights: we identify a decreasing order for each year between 1994 and 2005 but not
in 2006 and 2007. Thus, private commercial banks with a low regulatory capital ratio had,
on average, a higher asset-liability dependency than banks with high capital ratios. This
eﬀect can reﬂect a risk-absorbing eﬀect of capital (see the discussion above). The change
in the dependency measure between 1994-2007 was most pronounced for the ﬁrst tercile
(-0.18) and least pronounced for the third tercile (-0.016). This indicates that private
commercial banks in the second and third tercile had a relatively constant and low asset-
liability dependency over time while the private commercial banks belonging to the ﬁrst
tercile systematically reduced their asset-liability dependency. These results show another
similarity between US and German commercial banks: DeYoung and Yom (2008) also
ﬁnd that US commercial banks with strong regulatory safety have weaker asset-liability
dependencies. While these ﬁndings are consistent with the view that regulators allow
well-managed banks more leeway in risk-taking (DeYoung et al. (2001)), the question of
how the decline in the asset-liability dependency of poorly-capitalized banks (banks in the
ﬁrst tercile) over the sample period are related to the recent stress in the banking industry
remains unsolved.
For private commercial banks, the results for the liquidity ratio look similar to the
results which we yield for the capital ratio. However, unlike the capital ratio, the clas-
siﬁcation of banks into terciles is built on the prudential liquidity regulation which only
has been in force since 2000. While we do not observe any remarkable change in the
asset-liability dependency around the year 2000, we ﬁnd a decreasing cross-sectional or-
17der in the asset-liability dependency between 1994-2002, though not after 2002. More
speciﬁcally, private commercial banks in the ﬁrst tercile reduced their asset-liability de-
pendency steadily over the sample period, while banks in the second tercile reduced their
asset-liability dependency only slightly. Hence, a high liquidity ratio coincides with a low
asset-liability dependency at the beginning of our sample period but this correlation is
less pronounced nowadays.
Insert Table 6 about here
For savings and cooperative banks, the closeness to the threshold speciﬁed in the pruden-
tial capital and liquidity regulation has no systematical relevance for the asset-liability
dependency. This might be because savings and cooperative banks enjoy a comprehensive
insurance scheme: Not only are the deposits insured, but the guarantee covers the whole
institute. Due to this comprehensive guarantee, the capital and liquidity ratio of a sin-
gle savings bank and cooperative bank may not have such an eﬀect on the asset-liability
structure.
5.3 Bank proﬁtability
To test whether the old industry wisdom concerning the relationship between bank prof-
itability and the asset-liability dependency still holds, we use the bank’s return on equity
(ROE), the share of income that stems from provisions, and the volatility of the ROE. We
calculate the ROE volatility as the time-series standard deviation of the ROE for those










Table 7 condenses our ﬁndings for banks’ proﬁtability based on the dependency mea-
sure ˆ φ which we calculate for each tercile group of each banking sector and for each year.
As in Table 6, we report the average dependency measure between 1994 and 2007, the
change in the dependency measure between 1994 and 2007, and the number of years in
which the dependency measure has a cross-sectional increasing or decreasing order.
In the case of private commercial and savings banks, the ﬁndings do not indicate
the highest dependency for the banks with low ROE and the lowest dependency for the
18banks with high ROE. For the cooperative banks, however, the time-series means of the
dependency measure is 0.083 for the ﬁrst tercile (banks with low ROE) and 0.070 and 0.067
for the second and third tercile, respectively, suggesting a cross-sectional decreasing order
in the dependency measure. Between 1994 and 2000 (2001 and 2007), we ﬁnd six (three)
cases of a decreasing order, i.e. the ROE and the asset-liability are negatively correlated
in nine out of 14 years. This is signiﬁcant at the 1%-level.7 The change in the dependency
measure is by and large similar across the tercile groups of cooperative banks suggesting
a rather similar, i.e., strictly speaking parallel, decrease in the dependency measure over
time.
The share of provision income has some relevance for the asset-liability dependency
in all three banking sectors but in varying ways. For private commercial banks, the
provision income negatively correlates with the asset-liability dependency: the higher
the share of provision income, the lower the asset-liability dependency. For savings and
cooperative banks, the provision income is positively correlated with the asset-liability
dependency between 2001-2007: the higher the share of provision income, the higher
the asset-liability dependency. These adverse ﬁndings probably come from the diﬀerent
business models or more concretely from the diﬀerent sources of the provision income in
the three banking sectors. For private commercial banks, provision income is likely to
come from investment bank activities unrelated to interest-bearing lending and funding
decisions with the result that a higher provision income might allow private commercial
banks to bear more term transformation risk. By contrast, provision income in the sectors
of savings and cooperative banks is more likely to be generated by account management
charges which may coincide with high amounts of short-term deposits that these banks
cannot or do not use in term transformation. This would then lead to a higher asset-
liability dependency.
Insert Table 7 about here
The banks with the lowest ROE volatility tend to be those with little dependency, and
vice versa. This result holds for all three sectors although it is not signiﬁcant for all three
7There are six permutations of the order of the three items. Therefore, under the null hypothesis of
random order, the number X of a certain order is binomially distributed: X ∼ B (n = 14,p = 1/6). If
X ∼ B (14,1/6), then Pr(X ≥ 8) = 0.07% and Pr(X ≥ 9) = 0.01%.
19banking sectors. For private commercial banks, we ﬁnd that in 4 out of 7 cases there
is an increasing order between 1994 and 2000 but none afterwards. Thus, in our ﬁrst
subsample, banks with low ROE volatility are those with low asset-liability-dependency
and vice versa. In the case of savings banks, we ﬁnd an increasing order in the dependency
measure in all 14 of the 14 years. For cooperative banks, we ﬁnd some cases of a decreasing
order in the ﬁrst subsample but we identify an increasing order in all 7 of the 7 cases in
the second subsample.
5.4 Sensitivity checks
In each part of our analysis we carry out a number of sensitivity checks. First, as alter-
native dependency measures, we use correlation coeﬃcients between the sum of long-term
assets and the sum of long-term liabilities and canonical correlations. Irrespective of the
dependency measure used, we ﬁnd that the dependency between assets and liabilities de-
creased in the course of time and that the asset-liability dependency varies systematically
with the use of derivatives, regulatory capital and liquidity and bank proﬁtability.
Second, we take into account that, during our sample period, a large number of banks
merged or were acquired.8 For instance, the number of savings banks shrank from 532
in 1994 to 446 in 2007 while the corresponding number of cooperative banks were 1,946
in 1994 and 1,229 in 2007. To account for these changes in the number of banks we
constructed a restricted sample of those banks that stayed in the original sample from
1994 to 2007. The results based on this modiﬁed sample are qualitatively the same.
Hence, we conclude that the results are not driven by the merger and acquisition wave
among the savings and cooperative banks.
Third, we investigate whether our division of banks into terciles is a driving factor
behind our ﬁndings. The results presented in Tables 5, 6 and 7 (except for derivatives,
the liquidity ratio and the ROE volatility) are based on a time-varying classiﬁcation of
banks. This implies that a bank with a particular characteristic can be included in the
ﬁrst tercile in one year and in the second or third tercile in another year. To check
whether this classiﬁcation drives our ﬁndings, we alternatively classify banks according
to their characteristics in the starting year of our sample and re-calculate our measure of
8See for more details K¨ otter (2005).
20the asset-liability dependency. It transpires, however, that the time-constant and time-
varying classiﬁcation produce broadly similar results. We also examine whether classifying
banks according to the ROE volatility between 1994-2000 and 2001-2007 changes our main
ﬁndings. It transpires that the ﬁndings are insensitive to this alteration, too.
Finally, we also experiment with banks’ credit lines and loan commitments to other
banks and non-banks, a further characteristic that may shape the asset-liability depen-
dency. Kashyap et al. (2002) show theoretically and Gatev et al. (2009) ﬁnd empirically
that synergies between credit lines and deposit-taking allow banks to reduce their liquid
asset holdings. Both credit lines and deposit-taking require banks to hold large amounts of
liquid assets but when loan commitment take-downs and deposit withdrawals are imper-
fectly correlated banks can reduce their liquid asset holdings. Such a synergy eﬀect might
also impact on the asset-liability dependency. However, we do not ﬁnd any evidence that
the degree of the asset-liability dependency varies according to the banks’ loan commit-
ments. Since the data on loan commitments are of relatively low quality (the information
is not available for all the banks and all the years), we do not conclude from these ﬁndings
that loan commitments have no relevance and, therefore, do not report these results.
6 Conclusion
We started our analysis by postulating that recent developments in risk transfer instru-
ments, changes in business models due to new technologies, and changes in prudential
regulations may have reduced the dependency of banks’ assets and liabilities. Our ﬁnd-
ings describe how the asset-liability dependency for German universal banks behaved over
the period 1994 to 2007 without claiming to provide in-depth insights into what have
caused these changes in the degree of dependency. Our ﬁndings show that the overall
dependency between assets and liabilities has decreased in the last 14 years for all three
sectors of universal banks (private commercial banks, savings banks, cooperative banks).
This overall decline is related to selected asset and liability positions only: It can be
attributed to a lower dependency of long-term loans to non-banks and to a lower de-
pendency of short-term deposits, while other positions, such as savings account, did not
contribute as much to the overall decline. Our ﬁndings also indicate that the decline is
most pronounced for those groups of banks within each banking sector that intensively
use derivatives instruments.
21Our analysis also provides insights into whether the asset-liability dependency sys-
tematically varies with the regulatorily deﬁned bank capital and with bank proﬁtability.
For private commercial institutions but not for savings and cooperative banks we ﬁnd
that banks with lower regulatory capital have higher asset-liability dependencies than
banks with higher regulatory capital. The diﬀerence between well-capitalized and poorly-
capitalized banks diminishes since the asset-liability dependency of private commercial
banks with lower regulatory capital declines more strongly than that of their counterparts
with high regulatory capital. We ﬁnd that proﬁtability has a bearing on the asset-liability
dependency but not in the same way for the three sectors. Asset-liability dependency is
lower for private commercial banks with higher provision income, for savings banks with
lower ROE volatilities and for cooperative banks with higher ROEs.
In this study we mainly applied descriptive statistics, complemented by statistical
tests where appropriate and possible. The descriptive analyses have the advantage that
the results do not rely on strong econometrical assumptions, for instance concerning the
distribution of error terms. Nevertheless such descriptive analyses do not allow us to make
any statements about causality. Thus, future research may aim at disentangling whether
and how recent developments in risk-transfer instruments and risk management techniques,
the adoption of information and communication technology by the banking business and
changes in regulations have shaped the structure of the banking industry. Disentangling
these eﬀects is necessary to gain insights into the causes of the recent ﬁnancial instability.
22References
Ambrose, B., M. LaCour-Little, and A. Sanders (2005). Does regulatory capital arbi-
trage, reputation, or asymmetric information drive securitization? Journal of Financial
Services Research 28, 113–133.
Bannier, C. E. and D. N. H¨ ansel (2007). Determinants of banks’ engagement in loan
securitization. Goethe-University Frankfurt.
Berger, A. N. and C. H. S. Bouwman (2008). Bank liquidity creation. Review of Financial
Studies forthcoming.
Bhattacharaya, S. and A. Thakor (1993). Contempary banking theory. Journal of Finan-
cial Intermediation 2, 2–50.
Brewer, E., W. E. Jackson, and J. T. Moser (2001). The value of using interest rate
derivatives to manage risk at U.S. banking organizations. Economic Perspectives, Fed-
eral Reserve Bank of Chicago.
Brewer, E., B. A. Minton, and J. T. Moser (2000). Interest rate derivatives and bank
lending. Journal of Banking and Finance 24, 353–379.
Deutsche Bundesbank (1999). Principle II on the liquidity of institutions, banking legis-
lation 2b. Frankfurt am Main.
Deutsche Bundesbank (2000). Bankenstatistik. 12/2000.
Deutsche Bundesbank (2005). Bankenstatistik. 12/2005.
Deutsche Bundesbank (2008). Bankenstatistik. 12/2008.
DeYoung, R., J. Hughes, and C. Moon (2001). Regulatory distress costs and risk-taking
at U.S. commercial banks. Journal of Economic Business 53, 255–282.
DeYoung, R. and T. Rice (2004). Noninterest income and ﬁnancial performance at U.S.
commercial banks. The Financial Review 39, 101–127.
DeYoung, R. and C. Yom (2008). On the independence of assets and liabilities: Evidence
from U.S. commercial banks, 1990-2005. Journal of Financial Stability 4, 275–303.
23Entrop, O., C. Memmel, M. Wilkens, and A. Zeisler (2008). Analyzing the interest rate risk
of banks using time series of accounting-based data: Evidence from Germany. Discussion
Paper Deutsche Bundesbank, Series 2, 01/2008.
Federal Banking Supervisory Oﬃce (FBSO) (1998). Explanatory notes on the announce-
ment of the amendment of the principle concerning the own funds and liquidity of
institutions.
Gatev, E., T. Schuermann, and P. E. Strahan (2009). Managing liquidity risk: How
deposit-loan synergies vary with market conditions. Review of Financial Studies 22,
995–1020.
Gorton, G. B. and G. G. Pennacchi (1995). Banks and loan sales marketing nonmarketable
assets. Journal of Monetary Economics 35, 389–411.
Guzman, M. G. (2001). Bank competition in the new economy. The Southwest Economy,
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas 1, 6–9.
Hartmann-Wendels, T. and C. Wendels (1999). Finanzierungsgrundsatz II. WISU 7,
Studienblatt (Beilage).
Harvey, J. and K. Spong (2001). The decline in core deposits: What can banks do?
Financial Industry Perspectives Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
Hempell, H. S. (2002). Testing for competition among German banks. Discussion Paper
Deutsche Bundesbank Series 1, 04/2002.
Kashyap, A. K., R. Rajan, and J. Stein (2002). Banks as liquidity providers: an ex-
planation for the co-existence of lending and deposit-taking. Journal of Finance 57,
33–73.
Kishan, R. P. and T. P. Opiela (2000). Banks’ size, bank capital and the bank lending
channel. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 32, 121–141.
K¨ otter, M. (2005). Evaluating the German bank merger wave. Discussion Paper Deutsche
Bundesbank Series 2, 12/2005.
Lapavitsas, C. and P. D. Santos (2008). Globalization and contemporary banking: on the
impact of technology. Contributions to Political Economy, 1–26.
24Memmel, C. and I. Stein (2008). The prudential database BAKIS. Schmollers
Jahrbuch 128, 321–328.
Pikkarainen, T., K. Pikkarainen, H. Karjaluoto, and S. Pahnila (2004). Consumer accep-
tance of online banking: an extension of the technology acceptance model. Internet
Research 14, 224–235.
Repullo, R. (2004). Capital requirements, market power, and risk-taking in banking.
Journal of Financial Intermediation 13, 156–182.
Rosse, J. N. and J. C. Panzar (1987). Testing for monopoly equilibrium. Journal of
Industrial Economics 35, 443–456.
Sachverst¨ andigenrat zur Begutachtung der gesamtwirtschaftlichen Lage (2008). Das
deutsche Finanzsystem: Eﬃzienz steigern - Stabilit¨ at erh¨ ohen.
Schaeck, K. and M. Cihak (2007). Banking competition and capital ratios. International
Monetary Fund Working Paper 216.
Schmieder, C. (2006). The Deutsche Bundesbank’s large credit database (BAKIS-M and
MiMiK). Schmollers Jahrbuch 126, 653–663.
Sch¨ oning, S. (2004). Der Grundsatz II der Baﬁn - eine kritische Beurteilung (Teil I). Kredit
und Kapital 37, 383–417.
Simonson, D. G., J. D. Stowe, and C. J. Watson (1983). A canonical correlation analysis
of commercial bank asset and liability structures. Journal of Financial and Quantitative
Analysis 18, 125–140.
Sp¨ ork, W. and S. Auge-Dickhut (1999). Die neue Liquidit¨ atskennzahl - eine geeignete
Gr¨ oße zur Beurteilung von Kredit- und Finanzdienstleistungsinstituten? Zeitschrift f¨ ur
das gesamte Kreditwesen 4, 181–188.
Staikouras, S. K. (2006). Financial intermediaries and interest rate risk: II. Financial
Markets, Institutions and Instruments 15(5), 225–272.
Strahan, P. E. (2008). Liquidity production in 21st century banking. NBER Working
Paper No. W13798.
25Vives, X. (2001). Competition in the changing world of banking. Oxford Review of
Economic Policy 17, 535–547.
White, H. (1980). A heteroskedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimator and direct
test for heteroskedasticity. Econometrica 48, 817–838.
26Appendix
Assume the following regression model (k = 1,...,K denotes the cross sectional items
(here: banks), t = 1,...,T is the time dimension, and xt,k = (x1,t,k,...,xp,t,k)0 is a vector
of explanatory variables):
yt,k = αt + x0
t,kβt + εt,k (9)
with var(yt,k) = σ2
y,t and var(εt,k) = σ2
ε,t, i.e. the parameters α and β as well as the
variances may change in the course of time; in the cross section, however, these parameters
are constant. The residuals ε are assumed to be uncorrelated in the cross section but
may be correlated in the time dimension, i.e. corr(εt,k,εt,k0) = 0 ∀k,k0 k0 6= k, but
corr(εt,k,εt0,k) = ρk,t,t0.
The regression’s coeﬃcient of determination R2
t is not changed if the dependent variable
yt is divided by a scalar. We choose σy,t as the scalar and run the following regression for
each point in time t:
˜ yt,k = ˜ αt + x0
t,k ˜ βt + ˜ εt,k (10)
with ˜ yt,k = yt,k/σy,t, ˜ βt = βt/σy,t and ˜ εt,k = εt,k/σy,t. Due to this transformation, the
coeﬃcient of determination R2




t = 1 − var(˜ εt,k). (11)
Therefore, testing the null hypothesis H0 : R2
t = R2
t0 is equivalent to testing the hypoth-
esis var(˜ εt,k) = var(˜ εt0,k). The latter hypothesis can be tested by running the following
regression (See Entrop et al. (2008))
˜ εt,k = γ
 
˜ εt,k − ˜ εt0,k

+ ηk (12)









˜ εt,k − ˜ εt0,k
 (13)
=
var(˜ εt,k) − cov
 
˜ εt,k, ˜ εt0,k







˜ εt,k, ˜ εt0,k
 (14)
This regression coeﬃcient is equal to 0.5, if var(˜ εt,k) = var(˜ εt0,k), irrespective of the cor-
relation between ˜ εt,k and ˜ εt0,k. For the purpose of implementing the test, we replace σy,t
and ˜ εt,k with its empirical counterparts and estimate (12) with a robust covariance matrix
(see White (1980)).
27Data description and sources
Variable Description and source
Derivatives Ratio of notional amounts of derivatives relative to total assets
(time-constant tercile classiﬁcation (1996-2007), CREDIT REGISTER)
Size Total assets
(time-varying tercile classiﬁcation, BAKIS)
Capital ratio Capital ratio according to Principle I
(time-varying tercile classiﬁcation, BAKIS)
Liquidity ratio Liquidity ratio according to Principle II
(time-constant tercile classiﬁcation (2000-2007), BAKIS)
ROE Return on equity
(time-varying tercile classiﬁcation, BAKIS)
Provision income Ratio of provision income to total income
(time-varying tercile classiﬁcation, BAKIS)
ROE volatility Standard deviation of ROE
(time-constant tercile classiﬁcation, BAKIS)
BAKIS is the Bundesbank’s banking data storage system. For more information about
the BAKIS data set see Memmel and Stein (2008). For more information about the
German credit register see Schmieder (2006).
28Tables and ﬁgures
Balance sheet Percentiles Number of
position 25th 50th 75th observations
Cash 1.5% 2.1% 2.6% 32833
Interbank (st) 4.4% 7.7% 12.6% 32833
Interbank (lt) 0.1% 1.1% 4.1% 32833
Loans (st) 5.8% 8.1% 11.1% 32833
Loans (lt) 42.8% 51.8% 58.2% 32833
Bonds 11.1% 16.9% 23.7% 32833
Stocks 0.6% 1.3% 4.2% 32833
Sum of assets incl. 95.6% 96.9% 97.7% 32833
Interbank (st) 0.0% 0.2% 2.1% 32833
Interbank (lt) 7.4% 11.8% 16.9% 32833
Deposits (st) 22.3% 28.0% 34.6% 32833
Deposits (lt) 4.0% 6.6% 9.7% 32833
Savings accounts 25.9% 33.6% 39.9% 32833
Equity 5.1% 6.3% 8.7% 32833
Sum of liabilities incl. 90.5% 94.4% 96.7% 32833
Table 1: Structure of the banks’ assets and liabilities. Descriptive statistics of balance-
sheet positions over total assets, time span: 1994-2007. Includes private commercial banks,
savings banks and cooperative banks. (st) = short-term; (lt) = long-term.
29Balance sheet Mean share Test
position Priv. banks Sav. banks Coop. banks statistics
Cash 2.0% 2.2% 2.2% 0.0
Interbank (st) 31.0% 6.1% 9.2% 12.6***
Interbank (lt) 2.9% 1.7% 3.6% 0.5
Loans (st) 17.3% 7.4% 9.0% 3.1
Loans (lt) 25.3% 52.3% 51.1% 13.9***
Bonds 11.7% 20.1% 18.4% 2.0
Stocks 1.9% 6.5% 2.5% 2.1
Interbank (st) 25.0% 3.0% 0.8% 13.3***
Interbank (lt) 12.7% 17.4% 11.9% 2.2
Deposits (st) 27.6% 23.9% 30.8% 3.6
Deposits (lt) 5.8% 6.8% 7.8% 0.3
Savings accounts 4.6% 34.0% 35.1% 44.3***
Equity 12.1% 7.6% 7.0% 0.9
Table 2: Mean share of asset and liability positions, broken down into banking sectors;
time span: 1994-2007. (st) = short-term; (lt) = long-term. Test of equal mean shares in
a row: */**/*** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Figure 1: Dependency measure ˆ φ
30Figure 2: Dependency measure ˆ τ for selected asset and liability positions.
31Balance sheet Sector Change in ˆ τ
position 1994-2000 2000-2007
Private commercial banks 0.061 -0.155***
Loans (lt) Savings banks -0.247*** -0.200***
to non-banks Cooperative banks -0.158*** -0.096
Private commercial banks -0.241* 0.033
Deposits (st) Savings banks -0.320*** -0.251***
Cooperative banks -0.178* -0.130
Private commercial banks 0.012 0.017
Savings accounts Savings banks 0.117 -0.007
Cooperative banks -0.018 -0.070
Table 3: Change in the dependency measure ˆ τ for selected balance-sheet positions bro-
ken down into banking sectors. (st) = short-term; (lt) = long-term. */**/*** denote
signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
Private com. banks Savings banks Cooperative banks
1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd 1st 2nd 3rd
Variable Tercile Tercile Tercile
Derivatives 0.0% 3.5% 59.6% 0.0% 0.8% 4.8% 0.0% 0.4% 3.8%
Size 54 361 2,474 379 975 2,402 40 113 352
Capital ratio 10.3% 19.3% 66.2% 9.76% 11.0% 13.1% 9.71% 11.2% 13.7%
Liquidity ratio 1.3 2.1 5.9 2.0 2.6 3.5 1.7 2.1 2.9
ROE -1.0% 2.7% 9.5% 3.1% 4.8% 6.5% 3.3% 5.2% 6.9%
Provision income 0.0% 14.1% 51.7% 15.1% 18.9% 21.8% 12.5% 17.6% 22.6%
Volatility 2.2% 5.4% 12.7% 1.3% 2.3% 3.8% 1.2% 2.2% 4.1%
Table 4: Median of the terciles (the ﬁrst tercile includes the 33% lowest values) of diﬀerent
variables (time series means).
32Criterion Sector Tercile
1st 2nd 3rd
Start 0.078 0.103 0.151
Priv. c. banks 1st change -0.042 -0.020 -0.115
2nd change 0.026 -0.050 -0.008
start 0.144 0.225 0.250
Derivatives Savings banks 1st change -0.020 -0.046 -0.087
2nd change -0.072 -0.075 -0.077
Start 0.118 0.122 0.150
Coop. banks 1st change -0.043 -0.044 -0.075
2nd change -0.034 -0.035 -0.017
Start 0.039 0.117 0.172
Priv. c. banks 1st change 0.016 -0.048 -0.079
2nd change -0.030 0.017 -0.035
Start 0.237 0.236 0.188
Size Savings banks 1st change -0.054 -0.050 -0.084
2nd change -0.085 -0.096 -0.049
Start 0.125 0.139 0.130
Coop. banks 1st change -0.049 -0.054 -0.062
2nd change -0.029 -0.022 -0.036
Table 5: Start values and changes in the dependency measure ˆ φ for derivatives and bank
size. Start gives the value of the measure in 1994. 1st change and 2nd change is the
change in the dependency measure between 1994-2000 and 2000-2007, respectively.
33Criterion Sector Tercile # years for which ˆ φ is
1st 2nd 3rd decreasing increasing
Priv. c. banks mean 0.154 0.086 0.031 7*** / 5*** 0 / 0
change -0.180 -0.028 -0.016
Capital Savings banks mean 0.120 0.089 0.129 0 / 2 1 / 1
ratio change -0.162 -0.127 -0.175
Coop. banks mean 0.068 0.070 0.072 1 / 0 0 / 5***
change -0.106 -0.082 -0.071
Priv. c. banks mean 0.128 0.078 0.074 7*** / 2 0 / 0
change -0.204 -0.070 0.081
Liquidity Savings banks mean 0.087 0.070 0.158 0 / 0 1 / 0
ratio change -0.080 -0.099 -0.134
Coop. banks mean 0.089 0.101 0.063 1 / 2 0 / 0
change -0.047 -0.104 -0.072
Table 6: Time series means of and changes in the dependency measure ˆ φ for prudential
regulations. The last but one column gives the number of years for which the dependency
measure ˆ φ is on the decrease, i.e. the order is ˆ φ1st ≤ ˆ φ2nd ≤ ˆ φ3rd for the period 1994-
2000/2001-2007. The last column gives the number of years for which the dependency
measure ˆ φ is on the increase, i.e. ˆ φ1st ≥ ˆ φ2nd ≥ ˆ φ3rd for the period 1994-2000/2001-2007.
*/**/*** denote signiﬁcance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level.
34Criterion Sector Tercile # years for which ˆ φ is
1st 2nd 3rd decreasing increasing
Priv. c. banks mean 0.054 0.078 0.080 0 / 0 3* / 1
change -0.053 -0.081 -0.066
ROE Savings banks mean 0.157 0.105 0.152 0 / 0 0 /1
change -0.177 -0.066 -0.077
Coop. banks mean 0.083 0.070 0.067 6*** / 3* 0 / 0
change -0.099 -0.077 -0.077
Priv. c. banks mean 0.098 0.071 0.045 6*** / 5*** 0 / 0
change -0.092 -0.088 -0.043
Provision Savings banks mean 0.126 0.142 0.153 0 / 0 1 /6***
income change -0.152 -0.166 -0.098
Coop. banks mean 0.064 0.074 0.092 0 / 0 3* / 4**
change -0.075 -0.101 -0.082
Priv. c. banks mean 0.076 0.086 0.116 0 / 0 4** / 0
change -0.042 -0.067 -0.101
Volatility Savings banks mean 0.095 0.144 0.180 0 / 0 7*** / 7***
change -0.099 -0.093 -0.139
Coop. banks mean 0.063 0.071 0.075 3* / 0 1 / 7***
change -0.083 -0.081 -0.069
Table 7: Time series means of and changes in the dependency measure ˆ φ for bank prof-
itability. The last but one column gives the number of years for which the dependency
measure ˆ φ is on the decrease, i.e. the order is ˆ φ1st ≤ ˆ φ2nd ≤ ˆ φ3rd for the period 1994-
2000/2001-2007. The last column gives the number of years for which the dependency
measure ˆ φ is on the decrease, i.e. ˆ φ1st ≥ ˆ φ2nd ≥ ˆ φ3rd for the period 1994-2000/2001-2007.
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